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In light of the recent nancial and economic crisis the present paper analyzes
the determinants of loan default. We employ a unique rm-level panel data
of 700 bank loans given to small and medium sized enterprises in Slovakia
between 2000 and 2005 to investigate three loan default hypotheses. Testing
the Sector-Risk Hypothesis, we nd that agri-food industry does not exhibit
a higher default rate than other sectors. Testing the Firm-Risk Hypothesis,
we nd that highly indebted rms are more likely to default on their loan
than other rms. Testing the EU Subsidy Hypothesis we nd that the newly
introduced subsidy system, which is decoupled from production, provides a
secure source of income and hence reduces the probability of loan default.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The recent nancial and economic crisis has hit nancial markets partic-
ularly severely (IMF 2009; European Commission 2011). Since the begin-
ning of the crisis in 2008, the credit default rate has increased signicantly
resulting in losses to the lending banks, which in turn have signicantly re-
duced the issuance of new loans. Hence, from the perspective of banks, an
important question is to identify the most risky rms and sectors. From the
policy perspective an important question arises, which sectors/rms face
the highest risk due to inherent structural dierences, and hence require
policy support?
In order to answer these questions, the present paper analyzes the de-
terminants of the loan default rate. Empirically we investigate three loan
default hypotheses. The Firm-Risk Hypothesis says that, due to rm-level
idiosyncrasies, certain types of rms are more likely to default than oth-
ers. The Sector-Risk Hypothesis says that, due to sector-specic inherent
structural dierences, the agricultural sector is more exposed to credit de-
fault than other sectors. The Subsidy Hypothesis says that because the EU
subsidies are decoupled from production and hence from the systemic and
idiosyncratic risks inherent to agriculture, they improve the agricultural
rms' ability to repay bank loans.
Whereas the literature on loan defaults in developed countries' nan-
cial markets is extensive and conclusive (e.g. Lzal 2002; Jacobson et al.
2005; Agarwal and Hauswald 2007), there is considerably less evidence on
loan default rates in transition economies generally (Fidrmuc and Hainz
2010), and in agriculture particularly (Featherstone et al. 2006; Jouault
and Featherstone 2006; Udoh 2008).1 Agricultural credit markets are, how-
ever, of great interest for policy makers in transition economies, where
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1The present paper extends the analysis of Fidrmuc and Hainz (2010), who analyze
the determinants of rm defaults with respect to liquidity, protability, indebtedness,
and the legal form. In addition to Fidrmuc and Hainz, we attempt to identify dierences
in defaults of agricultural and food processing rms compared to rms in other sectors.
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agricultural sector is considerably more important than in developed e-
conomies. Loans in agriculture may be more risky than loans in other
sectors due to agriculture-specic structural characteristics: (i) signicant
time lag between input purchase and production sale due to seasonal char-
acter of agricultural production; (ii) complex management environment
due to biological character and spatially separated production; (iii) lower
value of farm collateral due to asset specicity of agricultural production;
(iv) costly monitoring of farm activities for lender; and (v) volatility in
agricultural rms' performance due to external factors which cannot be
controlled either by rms or lenders (e.g. weather, diseases) (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986; Barry and Robison 2001). These characteristics of
agricultural production aect the whole chain of agricultural credit mar-
ket: from lending pattern of lenders to borrowers' behavior in terms of loan
demand, utilization and default.
In order to test the theoretical hypotheses, we employ a unique set of
panel data on loans given to around 700 agricultural and non-agricultural
small and medium sized enterprises in Slovakia between January 2000 and
June 2005. This period is particularly well suited to address the question
of credit risk, because the rate of loan growth was rather moderate, and
the average loan default rate for small and medium sized enterprises was
6.0 per cent (9.7 per cent for agricultural rms).
Our results have important policy implications for policy makers in
transition economies. By implementing policies that address agriculture-
specic risk and information asymmetry, borrowers would default less often
on loan repayment, which in turn may induce the lenders to relax the ra-
tioning of credit supply, resulting in better liquidity and credit constraint
conditions of agricultural farms, and hence higher productivity and income.
2. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
According to Lzal (2002); Jacobson et al. (2005); and Agarwal and
Hauswald (2007), loan default is closely related to corporate bankruptcy
and hence must be studied together. On the one hand, the main determi-
nants of bankruptcy are related to problems of indebtedness, protability,
liquidity and solvency (Altman 1968). On the other hand, rms are more
likely to default, if they are less protable, less liquid, highly indebted, or
if the legal system does not create ecient incentives to repay the loans
(Alary and Gollier 2004; Beaver 1966). According to Ciaian et al. (2012),
an important source of loan default in agriculture is over-indebtedness,
which reduces the incentives to increase the success of the rm, but in-
creases incentives to undertake risky investments, resulting in even higher
default rate. Also rm protability and liquidity can contribute toward
explaining the determinants of loan default. Low protability may reect
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failure of investment, whereas low liquidity can cause nancial bottlenecks,
which may also result in defaults. The legal form of the rm may also
have implications on default, because it aects the liability of the borrower
and hence it determines the benets and costs from the loan default (see
Bester, 1987, 1994; Holmstrom, 1996, and Hainz, 2003). Further rm-level
idiosyncrasies aecting loan default rate are local weather shocks, local crop
and animal diseases, and farm household life crises. Given that these id-
iosyncratic shocks are specic to rms, they may cause higher default rates
among some types of rms compared to others (Firm-Risk Hypothesis).
The agricultural sector may face higher risk and hence may default more
likely than other sectors, because agricultural production is subject to
sector-specic systemic risk (e.g. due to whether, diseases). Complex
management environment of agricultural activities (e.g. due to lengthy
biologically based production, importance of external factors in farm per-
formance; spatially separated production; signicant lag between the time
of input purchase and the time of production sales; etc.), makes the mon-
itoring of rm performance more dicult and costly both for rms and
lenders. This may degenerate to ex-post moral hazard behavior of borrow-
ers thus increasing the default rate in the agricultural sector. Given that
the causes of these types of risks are specic to agriculture, they may cause
higher default rates in agriculture compared to other sectors (Sector-Risk
Hypothesis).
With the EU accession, Slovakia adopted the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP). The primary objective of the new agricultural subsidy system
(SAPS) was to provide income support to agricultural rms. In addition,
the SAPS may aect also rural credit markets, because they present a rela-
tively safe form of payment from the EU budget and hence provide a secure
income stream. Given that the SAPS is decoupled from production and
hence from the systemic and idiosyncratic risk inherent to agriculture, like-
ly it will reduce the overall uncertainty of agricultural income.2 We expect
that the SAPS would improve the agricultural rms' ability to repay bank
loans (Subsidy Hypothesis).
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Following Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966), in order to study the de-
terminants of loan defaults of agricultural and non-agricultural rms, we
estimate several specications of probit models. Our dependent variable is
the conditional probability that rm i defaults on its loan at time t, given
2The subsidies implemented before the EU accession where linked to production ac-
tivities and thus were more susceptible to production risks (Ciaian and Swinnen 2009).
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the available information set, 
, on rm i at time t  1:
P (qi;t = 1 j 
t 1) = 1 + 2Ci;t 1 + 3Li;t 1 + 4Pi;t 1 (1)
+5Si;t 1 + Zi;t + i;t
where C, L, and P denote nancial ratios on rms' indebtedness, liquid-
ity and protability, and Z is a vector of additional control variables (time
and legal form dummies). In order to identify inter-sectoral dierences in
loan default, we include sectoral dummies, S. In selected specications we
include also time eects, which cover the business cycle and bank-specic
developments. In order to address potential endogeneity issues, all explana-
tory variables are lagged by one year, hence we can consider them to be
exogenous.
Equation (1) includes the key factors identied in the literature on default
probability estimations (Chan-Lau, 2006), credit scoring models (Miller
and LaDue 1989; Mester 1997), and enterprise restructuring in transition
economies (Ciaian and Kancs 2011; Ciaian et al. 2012). The control vari-
ables follow the traditional literature on nancial ratios and bankruptcies
(Altman 1968; and Beaver 1966). Following Mester (1997) and Berger et
al. (2005), we only include robust variables, which are fewer than in credit
scoring models.
In extensive sensitivity analysis we also control for possible nonlineari-
ties.3 However, the quadratic terms were insignicant for all explanatory
variables. Similarly, the Link test for model specication (Pregibon 1980)
reveals no problems with the specied model.4
4. DATA
In order to test the three loan default hypotheses empirically, we employ
a unique rm-level panel data set on small and medium sized enterprises
in Slovakia for the period between 2000 and 2005. The data comes from a
major commercial bank in Slovakia that issues dierent types of loans to
rms in all sectors and regions of the country.5
The data set consists of two main parts. The rst part provides infor-
mation about whether a rm defaulted on its loan during the ve partially
overlapping periods of 18 months. The individual reporting periods start
in January (e.g. the rst period being January 2000 to June 2001, the last
3These results are available from the authors upon request.
4The link test is based on the regression of the left hand variable (default probabilities
in our case) on the tted values from the tested regression as well as the squares of those
values. The values squared should not be signicant if the model is specied correctly.
5For a more detailed description of the data see Fidrmuc and Hainz (2010).
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period being January 2004 to June 2005). Note that the default companies
are dropped from the sample after the period in which the insolvency oc-
curred. In order to ensure consistency between the time periods, rms who
repaid their loans before the end of the payment period are also dropped
from the sample.6 The data set includes only rms with double-entry book-
keeping in order to guarantee a reliable data base. As usual, the original
indicators were checked on consistency before the estimations.
The second bloc of our data set includes selected nancial indicators from
rms' annual balance sheets published in December of the respective year
before the reported period (e.g. December 1999 is used for the explanation
of defaults between January 2000 and June 2001).7 All indicators are
dened as shares in the total assets or liabilities. The total sales describe
the size of rms, and are used for the denition of the small and medium
size enterprises: total sales between SKK 30 million (approximately EUR
1 million) and SKK 300 million (approximately EUR 10 million). The
majority of analyzed rms have total sales in the lower range of the above
spectrum.
Following the general practice in loan default literature (Lzal 2002; Ja-
cobson et al. 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald 2007), we dene the default if
a loan is written o, or after the repayment delay exceeds 90 days. Al-
ternatively, defaults are also counted if the bank classies a borrower as
substandard, doubtful or loss-making during the observed period. With
few exceptions, the bank has terminated the relationships with defaulting
companies after either eventual repayment of the obligations or after the
company became bankrupt. The data set does not provide any data for
recoveries of defaulting companies, which are supervised by a specialized
unit of the bank.
Figure 1 shows the development of loans granted and defaulted dur-
ing the period analyzed. Figure 1 suggests only a slightly higher default
rate between January 2002 and June 2003 in general, but a higher default
increase for the agricultural sectors (see Figure 2). This pattern of de-
velopment corresponds to the business cycle in Slovakia, which illustrates
a higher sensitivity of agricultural sector to external economic conditions.
Similarly, we can see a moderate expansion of credits to small and medium
sized enterprises in 2004 and 2005. This development pattern approximate-
ly follows the development of credits granted in Slovakia (NBS 2008).
For the whole period, we have 1496 observations available for 667 small
and medium sized enterprises, 90 of which (6.0 per cent of all observations)
defaulted on their loan repayment during the observation period. In the
6The debtors are unlikely to default if credits are already nearly repaid. The inclusion
of those rms could bias the results.
7Unfortunately, the lack of data on xed assets as a proxy for collateral restricts our
analysis in this respect.
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FIG. 1. Development of Loans and Defaults
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FIG. 2. Defaults Rates by Periods and Sectors
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Figure 2: Defaults Rates by Periods and Sectors
subsample of agricultural and food processing companies, we have 462 ob-
servations of which 41 rms defaulted (8.9 per cent). Among all Slovak
banks, the average share of non-performing loans in the total assets de-
creased from 24.3 per cent in 2000 to 7.2 per cent in 2004 (EBRD, 2005a).
Thus, the quality of banks' portfolio is above average.
According to our data, the default rates in Slovakia are (slightly) above
the international gures. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and Jacobson et
al. (2005) report a default rate of 2.7 per cent for small and medium
sized enterprises in the US and default rates between 0.9 and 2.3 per cent
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for Sweden. In turn, Altman and Suggitt (2000) report average default
probabilities for a ve year period (measured by a similar indicator based
on the number of issuers) of about 4.5 per cent for loans to companies
with an original S&P rating B and 23 per cent for companies with rat-
ing Caa.8 Regarding the agricultural sector, historical trends in ve US
states provided in the study of Kim (2005), indicate a declining share of
defaulted agricultural loans' form around 6 per cent in 1985 to around 1
per cent in 2003. Featherstone et al. (2006) report a similar default level
(1.8 per cent) for the period 1995-2002 in eleven US states. Jouault and
Featherstone (2006) report an upper rate of defaulted agricultural loans in
north-eastern France amounting to 6.3 per cent of total loans. In contrast,
Nigerian data reported in Udoh (2008) indicate rather widespread defaults
for government sponsored agricultural loans: between 30 and 45 per cent of
loans completely defaulted; between 40 to 50 per cent were partly repaid,
whereas only between 15 and 25 per cent were fully repaid.
Our data sample does not include companies without bank loans.9 Nev-
ertheless, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that on average
the share of credits is rather small (15 per cent of total liabilities for full
sample and 11 per cent for agricultural and food subsample). By contrast,
we have rms from those with nearly zero loans up to those with 85 per
cent of total liabilities. This shows that the selection bias should not play
an overwhelmingly important role in our data set.10
5. RESULTS
The estimation results are reported in Tables 2-4. Specications (1), (3),
and (5) report the basic model, where we include the explanatory vari-
ables, covariates, and dummy variables for agriculture and food processing
sectors. In the augmented model (specications (2), (4), and (6)) we also
account for time, legal form and sectoral eects (other than agriculture
and food processing).11 In specications (3) - (6) we regroup the whole
sample into lowly and highly indebted rms. The highly indebted group
includes rms with the share of bank loans above the median, whereas
lowly indebted rms are rms below the median.
8The latter rm group analyzed by Altman and Suggitt (2000) is most suitable to be
used as comparison point for small and medium size enterprises.
9Approximately 56 per cent of Slovak small and medium sized enterprises had no
loans in 2005 (EBRD, 2005b).
10Also other authors nd that the selection bias is not severe in similar types of
samples (Chakraborty and Hu 2006).
11The default eects of sectoral dummies (i.e. construction, commerce, other services,
agriculture primary, food processing) in specications (2), (4), and (6) are compared
relative to the default pattern of rm in that industry.
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TABLE 1.
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables
Total sales Bank loans, Earnings before Cash and
SKK million debts taxation bank accounts
Full sample (all rms)
A: Non-default companies
Mean 100319 0.152 0.033 0.298
Max 298431 0.853 0.488 27.727
Min. 30115 -  0:321 -
Std. Dev. 65584 0.125 0.078 0.832
B: Default companies
Mean 114200 0.177  0:038 0.1
Max 291358 0.666 0.171 0.715
Min. 30142 0.006  0:617 -
Std. Dev. 71465 0.147 0.119 0.138
Agricultural and food processing rms
A: Non-default companies
Mean 116716 0.108 0.006 0.23
Max 291358 0.56 0.206 3.969
Min. 30142 0  0:253  0:048
Std. Dev. 73206 0.088 0.05 0.322
B: Default companies
Mean 93663 0.154  0:035 0.07
Max 295424 0.483 0.125 0.519
Min. 30320 0.006  0:617 0.003
Std. Dev. 61935 0.136 0.13 0.093
Notes: see section 4 for description of variables.
Our results suggest an adverse and signicant eect of indebtedness on
loan default (specication (1) in Table 2). This eect is robust to the
inclusion of time and industry dummies, as well as dummies indicating
the legal form of the rms (specication 2). Our results suggest that loan
default is more likely by highly indebted rms (specications (5) and (6)).
The credit issuer bank still owns relatively ecient tools for assessing the a
priori risk,12 which is conrmed by the non-signicant bank loan coecient
for lowly indebted rms (see specications (3) and (4)).
12Unfortunately, we cannot include information on collateral, which is not available
in the data set. Possibly collateral and interest rates are high enough to guarantee
protability in the presence of higher risk rms too. We also computed the implicit
loan-specic interest rate similarly to Fidrmuc and Hainz, (2010) from the available
indicators, which was insignicant.
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TABLE 2.
Sector-Specic Determinants of Loan Default, January 2000 - June 2005
Full sample Low indebtedness level High indebtedness level
Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash and bank accounts  0:110  0:096  0:096  0:059  0:117  0:107
( 3:70) ( 4:46) ( 2:09) ( 2:09) ( 13:57) ( 8:92)
Bank loans 0:068 0:067 0.029  0:016 0:156 0:136
 2:16  3:76  0:32 ( 0:30)  7:75  5:04
Earnings before taxation  0:308  0:282  0:313  0:177  0:217  0:234
( 6:11) ( 4:63) ( 8:59) ( 7:64) ( 6:09) ( 8:88)
Agriculture dummy 0.019 0.014  0:006  0:010 0:104 0:129
 1:34  0:91 ( 0:75) ( 2:04)  6:65  5:68
Food processing dummy 0.026 0.021  0:008  0:007 0:061 0:079
 1:32  1:19 ( 0:33) ( 0:89)  21:25  11:54
Indebtedness level All All Low Low High High
Number of observations 1496 1496 748 716 748 748
Pseudo-R2 0.141 0.186 0.197 0.292 0.14 0.164
Log-likelihood  292:1372  276:991  134:317  117:155  148:629  144:451
Notes: All indicators are dened as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level
of indebtedness includes rm bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coecients
report changes in the probability for an innitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. z statistics
computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries in parentheses and
p-values in brackets. Time eects, legal form eects, and detailed industrial eects are not reported. ,
,  denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
According to the results reported in Table 2, we nd that those rms
that have relatively high cash amounts and nance available in their bank
accounts (relative to total assets) are signicantly less likely to default on
their loans. Second, we nd that companies with high earnings before tax-
ation are less likely to default on their loan than the average of the sample.
Thus, our empirical results conrm the Firm-Risk Hypothesis that rms
are more likely to default if they face liquidity problems (cash and bank
accounts) and low protability (earnings before taxation). These result-
s are in line with the theoretical literature on principal-agent problems
(Stiglitz 1987), and the empirical literature on the determinants of corpo-
rate bankruptcy (Altman 1968; Altman and Suggitt 2000; Bris et al. 2006;
Fidrmuc and Hainz 2010).
The sector dummy variables for primary agricultural and food processing
rms are not signicant in specications (1) and (2), implying that there
is no dierence in default rates between rms operating in the agri-food
sectors and rms operating in other sectors (Table 2). Hence, our results
do not support the Sector-Risk Hypothesis. This could be due to strong
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TABLE 3.
Determinants of Loan Default and EU Integration, January 2000 - June 2005
Full sample Low indebtedness level High indebtedness level
Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash and bank accounts  0:108  0:097  0:079  0:060  0:118  0:108
( 3:73) ( 4:56) ( 2:03) ( 2:07) ( 15:64) ( 9:96)
Bank loans 0:069 0:066 0.017  0:013 0:158 0:139
 2:23  3:71  0:2 ( 0:23)  8:51  5:51
Earnings before taxation  0:312  0:287  0:299  0:189  0:210  0:230
( 5:10) ( 4:29) ( 6:96) ( 5:88) ( 5:53) ( 7:67)
Agriculture dummy 0:028 0.018 0.002  0:009 0:103 0:124
 2:38  1:38  0:33 ( 1:88)  6:9  5:4
Food processing dummy 0.033 0.024  0:007  0:007 0:077 0:092
 1:43  1:26 ( 0:34) ( 0:88)  8:51  7:56
EUAgr dummy  0:024  0:015  0:021  0:011 0.001 0.01
( 2:00) ( 1:18) ( 0:34) ( 1:49)  0:08  0:81
EUFood dummy  0:021  0:01  0:028  0:021
( 0:80) ( 0:34) ( 1:01) ( 0:63)
Indebtedness level All All Low Low High High
Number of observations 1496 1496 744 712 748 748
Pseudo-R2 0.150 0.188 0.232 0.298 0.145 0.167
Log-likelihood  289:313  276:345  128:295  115:967  147:852  144:083
Notes: All indicators are dened as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level of
indebtedness included rms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coecients
report changes in the probability for an innitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. z statis-
tics computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries are reported in
parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets. Time eects, legal form eects, and detailed industrial
eects are not reported. , ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. A -
No food processing rms with low indebtedness level defaulted after the EU accession, therefore, the EU
eect for this group could not be estimated.
subsidising of agricultural sector in Slovakia. Other sectors of the economy
are not subject to comparable policy supports. Although subsidies granted
to the agricultural sector before the EU accession where linked to produc-
tion activities and thus were susceptible to production risks, they appear
to bring agricultural rms to a similar position as rms operating in other
sectors, which do not receive subsidies.
The results are dierent if we divide our sample into lowly indebted and
highly indebted rms. We nd that highly indebted rms in agriculture
and food processing are more likely to default than in any other sectors
in Slovakia (specications (5) and (6) in Table 2). In contrast, the lowly
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TABLE 4.
Determinants of Loan Default in Agriculture and Food Industry, January
2000 - June 2005
Full sample Low indebtedness level High indebtedness level
Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model Basic model Ext. model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash and bank accounts  0:293  0:229  0:224  0:0797  0:382  0:390
( 1:78) ( 2:22) ( 0:96) ( 0:97) ( 2:15) ( 2:64)
Bank loans 0:269 0:221  0:224  0:241 0:385 0:355
 3:34  4:17 ( 3:09) ( 2:73)  2:75  2:43
Earnings before taxation  0:368  0:418  0:269  0:286  0:403  0:424
( 3:23) ( 8:27) ( 6:19) ( 4:53) ( 3:20) ( 3:20)
Food processing dummy  0:016  0:015  0:0119  0:004  0:022  0:026
( 0:92) ( 2:90) ( 0:32) ( 0:29) ( 1:15) ( 2:00)
Indebtedness level All All Low Low High High
Number of observations 462 462 231 231 231 197
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.238 0.110 0.263 0.195 0.262
Log-likelihood  117:783  105:517  51:770  42:850  63:754  55:297
Notes: All indicators are dened as a share of total liabilities/assets. The sample with the high level of
indebtedness included rms bank loans as a share of total liabilities above the median. The coecients
report changes in the probability for an innitesimal change in continuous explanatory variables. z statis-
tics computed with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on two-digit industries are reported in
parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets. Time eects, legal form eects, and detailed industrial
eects are not reported. , ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
indebted agriculture and food processing rms show equal default proba-
bilities compared to other sectors.
Table 4 reports estimation results for the subsample of agricultural and
food industry rms. The estimated eects conrm approximately equal
default probabilities between the agricultural and food industry in the basic
specications with no time, legal form and sectoral dummies (specications
(1), (3) and (5)). In contrast, in specications (2) and (6) the estimates
suggest that food processing rms are less likely to default than agricultural
rms.
Table 3 extends the analyzes reported in Table 2 by including dummy
variables EUAgr and EUFood which are interaction variables of an EU
membership dummy that takes value one for the period of Slovakia's EU
membership and zero otherwise and the sector dummies standing for agri-
culture and food processing, respectively. The new subsidy system intro-
duced in Slovakia after the EU accession provides a secure income source
to agricultural rms and hence likely reduces loan defaults, because the EU
subsidies are decoupled from production risk since they are granted inde-
pendently of production level and independently of whether rms produce
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or not (Subsidy Hypothesis). In contrast, the previous subsidy system was
linked to production level and hence was more risky. This implies that
the dummy variables indirectly test the impact of decoupling of the CAP
subsidies on loan default. According to the results reported in Table 3,
there is sample evidence that the EU accession decreased default rates for
primary agricultural rms. This is particularly the case for lowly indebted
agricultural rms. These results indirectly indicate that the decoupling
of EU subsidies from production risk tend to improve the default behav-
ior of agricultural rms. The EUAgr dummy is negative and statistically
signicant for specications (1) and (3).
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In light of the recent nancial and economic crisis the present paper an-
alyzes the determinants of loan default. Empirically we investigate three
loan default hypotheses. The Firm-Risk Hypothesis says that, due to rm-
level idiosyncrasies, certain types of rms are more likely to default than
others. The Sector-Risk Hypothesis says that due to sector-specic inher-
ent structural dierences the agricultural sector is more exposed to credit
default than other sectors. The Subsidy Hypothesis says that because sub-
sidies are decoupled from production and hence from the systemic and id-
iosyncratic risk inherent to agriculture, they improve the agricultural rms'
ability to repay bank loans.
In order to test the theoretical hypotheses, we employ a unique rm-level
panel data set for loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises by
one of the largest banks in Slovakia during the period 2000 and 2005. This
period is particularly well suited for this type of analysis because loan
growth was moderate and did not show the extremely high growth rates of
the following years.
Testing the Firm-Risk Hypothesis, we nd that the rms with relatively
high cash amounts and nance available in their bank accounts (relative to
total assets) are signicantly less likely to default on their loans. We also
nd that companies with high earnings before taxation are less likely to
default on their loans than the average of the sample. Thus, our empirical
results conrm the Firm-Risk Hypothesis.
Testing the Sector-Risk Hypothesis, we nd that on average the agricul-
tural and food processing rms (full sample) do not exhibit a higher default
rate than non-agricultural rms. However, when accounting for rm het-
erogeneity, we nd that highly indebted agricultural and food processing
rms default more often than highly indebted non-agricultural and non-
food rms. Lowly indebted agricultural and food processing rms have
equal default probabilities compared to other sectors.
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Testing the Subsidy Hypothesis, which says that the new (decoupled)
subsidy system (SAPS) introduced with the Slovakia's EU accession pro-
vides higher security of income and hence induces lower default rates, we
nd sample evidence supporting this hypotheses. However, more (detailed)
data are necessary to provide more robust evidence for this hypotheses.
These results allow us to draw policy implications for agricultural credit
policy. For an ecient implementation of rural credit policy, loans need
to be targeted on those rms which due to inherent structural dierences
are particularly credit constrained, but not to be generally applied to all
rms. Given that those farms which receive more subsidies tend to default
less than farms with no or little subsidies, our results suggest that the
CAP subsidies may contribute toward addressing the rural credit issue,
implying that there may be less need for a specic credit support policy
for agricultural rms.
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